05-Wrong Address Verification
- This test case intentionally submits an incorrect or non-existent beneficiary address to verify that the system properly handles address verification failures.
- The purpose is to test error handling scenarios and ensure your application correctly processes address verification errors in the Travel Rule workflow.
Expected Request (VASP → GTR)
- Method:
POST - Base URL:
https://uat-platform.globaltravelrule.com - Endpoint:
/api/verify/v2/one_step - Authentication:
- mTLS (Mutual Transport Layer Security) when sending the API
- JWT Bearer Token or App Token authentication via Authorization header
- Header:
Content-Type: application/jsonAuthorization: Bearer [JWT_TOKEN]orX-Authorization: [APP_TOKEN]
- Body:
{
"requestId": "[REQUEST_ID]",
"network": "[NETWORK]",
"address": "INVALID_WRONG_ADDRESS_123456789",
"tag": "[TAG]",
"txId": null,
"verifyDirection": 2,
"targetVaspCode": "[TARGET_VASP_CODE]",
"ticker": "[TICKER]",
"amount": "[AMOUNT]",
"fiatName": "USD",
"fiatPrice": "[FIAT_PRICE]",
"sourceVaspCode": "",
"expectVerifyFields": ["110026","110025","110045"],
"piiSecuredInfo": {
"initiatorKeyInfo": {
"publicKey": "[MY_PUBLIC_KEY]"
},
"piiSecretFormatType": "FULL_JSON_OBJECT_ENCRYPT",
"piiSpecVersion": "ivms101-2020",
"receiverKeyInfo": {
"publicKey": "[THEIR_PUBLIC_KEY]"
},
"secretAlgorithm": "ed25519_curve25519",
"securedPayload": "[ENCRYPTED_PII]"
}
}
set -e
export CURL_SSL_BACKEND="openssl"
randomRequestId="test-"$(openssl rand -base64 48 | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | head -c "12")"-"$(date '+%Y%m%d%H%M%S')
curl -v --silent --location --request POST 'https://uat-platform.globaltravelrule.com/api/verify/v2/one_step' \
-k --cert ./certificate.pem --key ./privateKey.pem \
--header 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--header 'ignore-detect: true' \
# Please use one of Authorization or X-Authorization
--header 'Authorization: Bearer [JWT_TOKEN]' \
--header 'X-Authorization: [APP_TOKEN]' \
--data-raw "{
\"requestId\": \"$randomRequestId\",
\"network\": \"[NETWORK]\",
\"address\": \"INVALID_WRONG_ADDRESS_123456789\",
\"tag\": \"[TAG]\",
\"txId\": null,
\"verifyDirection\": 2,
\"targetVaspCode\": \"[TARGET_VASP_CODE]\",
\"ticker\": \"[TICKER]\",
\"amount\": \"[AMOUNT]\",
\"fiatName\": \"USD\",
\"fiatPrice\": \"[FIAT_PRICE]\",
\"sourceVaspCode\": \"\",
\"expectVerifyFields\": [\"110026\",\"110025\",\"110045\"],
\"piiSecuredInfo\": {
\"initiatorKeyInfo\": {
\"publicKey\": \"[MY_PUBLIC_KEY]\"
},
\"piiSecretFormatType\": \"FULL_JSON_OBJECT_ENCRYPT\",
\"piiSpecVersion\": \"ivms101-2020\",
\"receiverKeyInfo\": {
\"publicKey\": \"[THEIR_PUBLIC_KEY]\"
},
\"secretAlgorithm\": \"ed25519_curve25519\",
\"securedPayload\": \"[ENCRYPTED_PII]\"
}
}"
Hint:
addressfield is intentionally set to an invalid/non-existent address for testingverifyDirectionis set to 2 for Pre-Transaction Travel RuletxIdis null for Pre-Transaction scenario- Use
targetVaspCode:gdummyto ensure you get the expected test result - This test verifies that your error handling logic works correctly
Materials:
Expected Response (GTR → VASP)
{
"verifyMessage": "Address Not Found",
"verifyStatus": 200001,
"verifyStage": "ADDRESS_VERIFICATION"
}
When the beneficiary address does not exist or cannot be verified by the target VASP, the system returns:
- HTTP Status Code: 200
verifyStatus: 200001 (Address Not Found)verifyStage: ADDRESS_VERIFICATION- No PII verification will be performed (first stage failure)
⚠️ Verify your application properly handles this error by:
- Detecting verifyStatus 200001 as an address verification failure
- Not proceeding with blockchain transaction when address verification fails
- Prompting user to verify and correct the beneficiary address
- Implementing proper error logging and user notification
⚠️ Expected Behavior After This Error:
- Cancel withdrawal process
- Ask user to re-verify beneficiary address
- Do not execute asset transfer to blockchain
- Log error for compliance and debugging purposes